In these days one speaks more than never of the need for a political agreement against the economic crisis. It is logical. It is clear that the struggle against the crisis will be more effective if all the political and social forces collaborate between themselves and contribute in a positive way. Till now, this has been achieved in the ambience of the social forces: with all his ups and downs, the dialogue between businessmen, workpeople and government is essential to face to the crisis, to reduce his costs and to avoid a social failure.
In the political area it has not been possible even do not even do not even to come closer an agreement of this nature. And this is one of the things that separate the development of the crisis in Spain from what has happened in other countries. Because in all of them the political forces of the opposition have thought that the national interest must prevail over any other; and with signed agreements or without them, they are collaborating with his respective governments.
Any political agreement, to be viable, has to answer to a common interest; but, also, he has to answer also to the interest of each of the parts. Those who take part in an agreement have to have incentives for it; or at least, they do not have to have incentive for the disagreement.
This is precisely the problem that we have here. The situation is very complex, but the terms of the political competition are very simple and they come down to the following thing:
The Spanish socialist party needs the recovery and the PP needs the crisis.
The Government needs the recovery because all his performance is centred it is this firstly - and almost only one - target; and therefore the economic recovery will be the measurement of the success or of the defeat of his management in this Term.
The Spanish socialist party needs the recovery because he knows that it is the necessary condition – although not sufficient - to have the majority confidence of the citizens again.
And the PP needs the crisis because it has come to the conclusion that the crisis is the only thing that can allow him to gain the next elections and return to the power.
Mariano Rajoy is a politician happily become disillusioned about himself. After two successive defeats, it has assumed finally that will never be able to gain a few elections if it depends on the support that he could cause in the Spanish society. If the PP wins one day, it will be in spite of Rajoy. And I dare to say that it will be also in spite of the proper PP.
Consequently, he has decided to base his political strategy on a thing that seems of perogrullo, but that is the key of the current Spanish political situation: if it does not gain the Spanish socialist party, it will gain the PP. As the power one cannot declare vacancy and only there are two real government options, if one loses it will gain other one although it has not done anything for deserving it. It is the law of the democratic inertia applied up to his last consequences.
Rajoy hopes to come already to The Moncloa to loins of its own prestige, not either of his political proposals, nor even of the force of his party. All that has already tried it and does not serve. This time his bet is that it is the EPA (Survey of Active Population) the one that takes him to the power for pure inertia.
For the same reasoning for which the Socialists we know that we will be able only to win again if the economy and the employment recover, the PP knows that it will be able only to win if the economy and the employment do not recover. The crisis and the unemployment are his master key, the winning horse for which they have bet all his political resources so that he leads them up to the wished goal. They do not need that it gains Rajoy; it is enough to them that Shoemaker loses.
You will have seen that the PP takes many months without declaring itself on the fund of any of the big debates of social and economic policy that have appeared in Spain. It is deliberate. They replace the debate on the contents with a cataract of invectives and personal attacks against the Prime minister and limit themselves to hoping that the sulfur should do his work.
It is true that this strategy has the small disadvantage of which it is clearly harmful to the interest of Spain. But the leaders of the PP seem ready to assume this cost without excessive spiritual unease. Because from his perspective there is a top target: that the power returns to the hands of which it should never have gone out. For the Spanish right, any that one that occupies the power without being one of them is an okupa and there is no priority more priority to evict it.
In a fire, there are those who immediately put themselves to the task it of trying to suffocate and help to that there are no victims. And there are those who limit themselves to shouting: Fire!: Fire!, without making anything useful against him and contributing to the panic and to the confusion. If in some of them they perceive a little disguised exhilaration tone as the flames grow, perhaps the fact is that it has hopes to remain with the lot.
The case is that it can be that they obtain it. But they have a weakness: once they have chosen for the model of the “destructive passivity”, which they obtain it does not depend on them, depends on us. The inertia is his biggest ally and our biggest enemy. In this moment, to do is risked, but not doing is suicidal. Let's realize it well.
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